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T h i sp a p e ri n v e s t i g a t e sa na r r a yo fn o m i n a ls y s t e m sf o rt h eR u s s i a ne c o n o m y ,o fd o m e s t i c
price level, import prices, exchange rates, money stock, barter, nominal wages, and output,
and conducts I(1) and I(2) cointegration analyses. Post-stabilization monthly data are used,
1995:6-2001:5.
The price-wage spiral presence is tested, and the eﬀects of money and real exchange
rate. In the last system, barter is introduced, and the eﬀe c to ft h a to nt h ec o m p a r a t i v e
Polish-Russian analysis is discussed.
It is found that in Russia inﬂation has had mostly monetary roots, that exchange rate
was important for the price dynamics, and that ruble was ineﬃciently over-valued. While
the wage-price spiral was not found in the system without barter, in the system corrected for
barter the role of wages signiﬁcantly increased.
The paper concludes with a comparative policy analysis to Poland, which updates the
previous version in Vostroknutova (2003).
JEL codes: C32, E63, E64
Keywords: cointegration, I(2), monetary policy, incomes policy, stabilization, Russia1 Introduction
Russia has always been considered one of the least successful transition countries: both
concerning its stabilization path and the percentage of GDP recovered since the beginning of
transition. After the liberalization in January 1992, there were several attempts to stabilize
the economy that resulted in periods of tight monetary policy, followed by increases of prices.
Nevertheless, the trend of prices was more or less downward sloping. Finally, in 1995 the
government succeeded in stabilizing the economy. Russia then found itself struggling to
achieve output growth, which seemed unattainable until the crisis of 1998. Due to the crisis,
the exchange rate ﬁnally depreciated to its natural level, creating better conditions for import
substitution. Growth was ﬁnally achieved in 2000, some eight years after liberalization.
Compared to Poland’s two years, this is a tremendous amount of time. Russia still lacks
foreign direct investments,1 and the quality of growth achieved is questionable, as the GDP
ﬁgure was heavily driven by the growth of oil prices in 2000.2
Nevertheless, the IMF has recently expressed a positive view on the Russian economy:
”the large external current account and ﬁscal surpluses, together with the relatively com-
fortable level of foreign reserves, have placed Russia in a strong position to deal with the
less favorable environment. The [IMF] also found that the Government’s plans and priorities
suggest that the impressive momentum that has emerged in the structural reform area in
2001 is likely to be maintained next year”. However, the situation is still fragile and the
government has failed several times to keep the inﬂation goal, notwithstanding the latest
improvements in the external environment (oil price growth). While the IMF considers the
present improvement in the Russian economy as a delayed consequence of its eﬀorts in the
region, some economists object to this view. Stiglitz (2002, 2003) suggests that it was the
”shock therapy” stabilization, over-appreciation caused by fear of second round of hyper-
inﬂation, and the inability of the IMF to see the enormous excess capacity of the Russian
economy, that led to decade of decline.
One of the object puzzles of transition economics is the apparent diﬀerence between
Polish and Russian paths of stabilization, even though the reform packages were of the same
”shock therapy” type in both countries. The question that is often asked is why in Russia
stabilization took ten years, compared to two years in Poland. In this paper, I am trying
to shed some light on this question, by carrying out an empirical analysis of the Russian
economy. An empirical investigation into Stiglitz’s suggestion will not only contribute to
the discussion on Russian stabilization, but will also help us to understand the monetary
transmission mechanism that is eﬀective now, and to outline the long-run relations. In this
analysis, I draw comparisons to the analogous Polish analysis (Vostroknutova, 2003).
There exists surprisingly little empirical literature about the Russian stabilization. The
existing papers use only real systems, which are known to loose some important information
about the longer run. This paper uses the nominal system, instead of a real one, in order to
better understand the short-run and immediate eﬀects that stabilization policies had on the
1The highest per capita inﬂow of FDI was registered in Estonia ($401) followed by the Czech Re-
public and Lithuania (around $250). Croatia, Hungary, and Poland came next with sums below
$200 per capita. In Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia per capita FDI was below $100, and in Rus-
sia and Ukraine that number remained at around $15. The World Bank Transition Newsletter, 1999
(http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/so99/pgs7-8.htm).
2While Rautava (2002) ﬁnds that oil prices were not the sole factor of output growth, he does show that a
10% permanent increase in oil prices leads to 2.4% of growth in Russian GDP.
1output and prices. I use an I(2) cointegration analysis to ﬁnd an econometrically plausible
nominal-to-real transformation, and then make the ﬁnal conclusions in the I(1) framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section puts the paper in the
perspective of the existing literature and the stabilization plans and events, it also outlines
the econometric model. Section 3 describes the data, reports the analysis of an array of
nominal systems and considers the robustness of the results; in the last subsection barter
is included into the analysis, which changes the interpretation of the results. The last two
section conclude and report a comparison to Polish stabilization.
2 Background and the Model
Economic theory suggests that there are three main channels that fuel inﬂation: monetary,
labor, and external sectors. These are supposed to generate inﬂation due to excess money
supply, nominal wage increases above productivity level, or due to transmission of foreign
(dis)inﬂation. In transition countries, in addition, real variables (such as output) were found
to be important for the dynamics of nominal variables (such as prices). Due to this, hetero-
dox3 stabilization programs were advised by the international organizations for the countries
of transition, and Russia and Poland in particular (Dibooglu and Kutan, 2001).
It has often been found that monetary explanation (namely, that inﬂation occurs when
money stock grows faster than output, Friedman, 1989) does not hold for transition coun-
tries (Nikolic, 2000). This can be due to the undermined central bank independence during
transition, underdevelopment of the ﬁnancial system, and reduced importance of the interest
rates.4 However, the CB of Russia claims a mostly monetary axis for inﬂation, along with
Kim (2001) and Nikolic (2000). Some of the studies (sometimes the same ones) question this
result: Nikolic (2000) and Alan et al. (1996) found that a systematic pattern for money-price
relationship is fading in the new environment in Russia, and the broad money - inﬂation
relationship has proved to be unstable and sensitive to institutional changes. Buch (1998)
argues that the Russian CB could not fully control broad money, and also gave up control
over the foreign component of the money base. The ﬁnal answer about the importance of
money in Russian transition has been delayed, due to the short sample after the 1998 crisis.
I n c o m e sp o l i c i e sw e r ee ﬀectively introduced in Russia before the collapse of the USSR.
However, they did not play any substantial role in repressing wage growth (especially in
the state sector) as some high-priority industries were exempted from income ceilings. Such
exemptions quickly spread out further to other industries and income policies were soon
abolished. However, in 1990 incomes policies were modiﬁed. Wages exceeding the ceiling
were most heavily taxed in 1992, although the average level of wages was still quite low and
did not bind enterprises (Marrese, 1994). It seems that bounding wage policies existed in the
3In contrast to orthodox (money-based) programs, heterodox programs have an inﬂation target, a nominal
exchange rate target in the form of a crawling peg, and incomes policy to be implemented through a concerted
action of the government, trade unions, and enterprise managers (Buch, 1998).
4Soft budget constraints (that were severe in Russia) are found to be the reason why economic agents do
not react adequately to the interest rate changes. Also, massive privatization by foreign ﬁrms reduces the
power of monetary policy over them (Barada and Kutan, 1999). Buch (1998) extensively studies the reasons
why money becomes endogenous during the transition period, focusing especially on Russia. She mentions
directed credits, keeping insolvent banks liquid by the CB, and substitution of bank credit by trade credit and
tax arrears, as the features that can eventually counteract restrictive monetary policies.
2concealed form of in-kind payments to workers, and of widespread wage arrears.5 The oﬃcial
wage variable might not account for wage arrears. Thus, I am losing in the analysis of system
without barter payments, while gaining in the systems with barter (see explanations on pg.
21).
Fischer and Sahay (2000) present Russia as an example of not exiting into a more ﬂexible
exchange rate regime in time in the context of unsustainable mobility, and compare it to
Poland, which represents one of the most successful exits from such a regime. The econometric
analysis of the Russian exchange rate dynamic with respect to output and performance is
scarce. Rautava (2002) studies the inﬂuence of the oil prices and real eﬀective exchange rate
on Russian output and ﬁnds that 10% real appreciation is associated with 2.4% decrease in
output, in the long run. Moreover, he ﬁnds that in the short run the exchange rate is the
most important factor of output dynamics.
The importance of real variables during the transition period has been investigated
and accepted. Many researchers have found it beneﬁcial to include output into econometric
models, and have analyzed a two-way relationship between output and inﬂa t i o n( F i s c h e ra n d
Sahay, 2000; Brada and Kutan, 1999; Enev and Koford, 2000; Rautava, 2002). Thus, I
m i g h te x p e c tt oﬁnd the output variable signiﬁcant in the long-run relations for the Russian
economy.
An important role is often attributed to barter payments. Kim et al. (2001) deﬁne
barter as the volume of enterprise transactions that take place without money, which includes
pure barter (exchange of goods) as well as oﬀsets (writing oﬀ the mutual debts) and veksels
(special bills of exchange issued by companies and traded for goods by banks, ﬁrms and local
governments). This form of payment functioned as a means of payment in the demonetized
economy. In Fig.1 the percentage of barter in sales is shown, the series that is used in the
later analysis (see section 3.4).
Kim et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of barter on prices is less than that of money,
although a macro model that excludes barter will fail to capture all the relevant information
about interference in money and inﬂation in Russia. Indeed, we see that the percentage
of barter is an I(1) variable, and therefore might have a signiﬁcant impact on the nominal
system of the Russian economy. In Section 3.4 I analyze such systems and ﬁnd that barter
was important in the inﬂation formation in Russia.
In what follows, I will implement cointegration analysis to study an array of systems
of the Russian economy. I exclude the interest rates, due to the sharp evidence of their
unimportance. I take barter payments into account in the last system only, and the general
choice of variables is often constrained by the data availability.
A stochastic process integrated of order two, xt ∼ I(2), is a process that is made
stationary only by diﬀerencing it twice: ∆xt ∼ I(1), ∆2xt ∼ I(0). In the analysis in this paper,
it might sometimes be unclear why it is possible to use the tests from the I(1) framework in
5”Wage arrears began to grow rapidly in mid-1995. In the midst of faltering state authority and the col-
lapse of contractual obligations and their enforcement, the government resorted to more wage cuts, enterprises
withheld tax and wage payments, and local governments diverted federal funds earmarked for employee remu-
neration. The level of arrears in March 1997 reached 27.7 percent of total state sector wages. Wage arrears
aﬄicted virtually every region. Many workers were waiting six to eight months for their wages. More than
half of employees in state enterprises were claiming at least two months unpaid wages.” (The WB, Transition
Newsletter, 1998)









Figure 1: Percentage of barter in total sales in Russia. Source: Russian Economic Barometer.
order to make inferences in the I(2) model. Under certain conditions, explained below, it is,
however, possible. The I(1) VAR framework is described by the following equation:
∆Xt = ΠXt−1 +
k−1 X
i=1




Πi − I, Γi = −
k P
j=i+1
Πj,a n dDt is the deterministic term. Errors are
assumed to be i.i.d. in this model.
Let us assume that the system is actually I(2), i.e. it is best described by the equation:
∆2Xt = ΠXt−1 − Γ∆Xt−1 +
k−2 X
i=1
Ψi∆2Xt−i + ΦDt + ²t,t =1 ,..,T, (2)
where Γ = I −
k−1 P
i=1
Γi,a sa b o v e ,a n dΨi = −
k−1 P
j=i+1
Γj,i =1 ,..,k − 2. The I(2) model
has two reduced rank conditions (for Π and Γ matrices), while the I(1) model has just one,
Π = αβ0, see Johansen (1999).



















−c B1 ∆xt−1 | {z }
I(1)
.
In order to be found as a cointegrating relation, β0R1t has to be I(0):
β0R1t = β0xt−1 | {z }
I(1)
−β0c B1∆xt−1 | {z }
I(1)
∼ I(0) via CI(1,0) cointegration.
Thus, if xt ∼ I(2), then β0xt ∼ I(1), and still β0R1t ∼ I(0), a n do n ec a ns t i l lu s et h e
tests provided by the I(1) procedure to make an inference in the I(2) model. Then, tests for
stationarity will become tests for I(1)ness. Standard weak exogeneity tests will actually test
long-run weak exogeneity, i.e. zero columns in the {α0,α1} space only. Exclusion tests will
become tests for long-run exclusion from stationary cointegrating relations and from levels
part of the polynomially cointegrating ones. More detailed theoretical background for this
analysis can be found in Johansen (1995), Juselius (2002), and Jørgensen, Kongsted, and
Rahbek (1999).
3A n a l y s i s
The data is from the International Monetary Fund database, apart from the barter data,
which is from the Russian Economic Barometer. It is monthly, from 1995:6 till 2001:5, i.e.
71 observations. The graphs in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 demonstrate the levels and diﬀerences
for the data. The domestic price series (pr) is a logarithm of the consumer price index,
import price (pi) is a logarithm of the constructed import price index,6 exchange rate (s)i s
a logarithm of the exchange rate (rub/US$), (re) is a logarithm of the real eﬀective exchange
rate (IFS deﬁnition), money (m) is a logarithm of ruble broad money (M2), wage series (w)i sa
logarithm of the nominal average wage, and a proxy for output (y) is a logarithm of industrial
production index. In what follows, the Polish analysis is closely followed (Vostroknutova,
2003). Finally, a full comparison of the two countries is presented in the last section.
6A usual proxy for import price, i.e. the German price index, did not work either for Poland, or for Russia.
This is probably because of its comparatively much lower integration level, which gave a very large coeﬃcient
in the cointegrating relations and zero coeﬃcient in the I(2) trend. To construct this index for Russia, her
main importers’ price indices were taken, weighted by the (period average) share of their imports (alltogether
they accounted for about 53% of all Russian imports). The price indices were export prices where available,
and wholesale or production prices otherwise. The data are from IMF IFS and from the IMF country report
on Russia (2000).
As nothing but price indices (initially in the local currencies) was available, it was impossible to construct
an IFS-deﬁned import price index for Russia. The one that is ﬁnally analysed is not evaluated in rubles: its
units are index numbers that are constructed from index series that were reduced from the original series
evaluated in local currencies. Hence, it is an index ”reduced” from a basket of currencies, and therefore a
nominal eﬀective exchange rate (currency/rub) would need to be substracted from it, to get closer to the
oﬃcial deﬁniton.
To be able to compare the Russian and Polish systems, we should probably add Polish pi(zloty)+
ne(currency/zloty)=pi(currency), and consider a system that includes this variable. The closest that
















































































Figure 3: Data in diﬀerences
6I nT a b l e1t h es i n g l ev a r i a b l eu n i tr o o tt e s t sa r er e p o r t e d .O n ec a ns e et h a tf o rs o m e
variables I(2)-ness cannot be rejected.
Table 1. ADF tests for unit root.7
Variable t-adf Lag Variable t-adf Lag
pr -1.77 1 w -0.23 11
∆pr∗ -2.95 2 ∆w ∗∗ -4.20 10
∆2pr ∗∗ -9.44 1 ∆2w ∗∗ -3.56 10
pi -2.26 1 re -1.46 1
∆pi -2.70 3 ∆re∗ -3.3 2
∆2pi ∗∗ -4.29 5 ∆2re -2.56 2
s -1.59 3 y -1.71 12
∆s -2.46 9 ∆y ∗∗ -5.97 10
∆2s ∗∗ -9.46 1 ∆2y ∗∗ -9.32 10
m -1.60 12 mb -2.59 11
∆m -1.38 11 ∆mb ∗∗ -4.25 10
∆2m ∗∗ -4.57 10 ∆2mb ∗∗ -3.95 9
The following facts contribute to the diﬃculties in analyzing the Russian data: (1) the
sample is short, due to the later start of the stabilization; (2) the policies conducted were
much less transparent than in Poland; (3) there are fewer variables available for Russia (for
example, nominal eﬀective exchange rate data is absent and the import price variable was
constructed); (4) last but not least, there is the structural break of the 1998 crisis that has
created diﬃculties8 for the I(2) analysis on the software available to date. An array of systems
for the Russian economy has been analyzed.
Table 2. Systems analyzed.
System Restricted variables Unrestr.
1.p r p g s DM mwy t
2.p r p i s $ mwy t
3.p r s m w t
4.p r p i r e m w y d 989 -10 dummy11
5.p r r e m w y d 98 -d u m m y
6.p r + re m w y t dummy
7.p r + re bm w y -d u m m y 12
The results for systems 1 − 3 are not reported here; instead, they are given in the last
7The null hypothesis it that of the unit root, the tests are conducted in PcGive, and the standard procedure
for lag determination is used (see Hendry and Doornik, 1996). Trend and constant were ﬁtted into the level
series (critical values are -3.46 for 5%, and -4.062 for 1% signiﬁcance), and a constant alone into the diﬀerences
a n ds e c o n dd i ﬀerences (critical values are -2.894 for 5%, and -3.504 for 1% signiﬁcance). Two stars indicate
rejection on the 5% level, and one star corresponds to one percent.
8It is impossible to restrict an exogenous variable to the cointegration space in the I(2) procedure. It is also
known that dummies have a very signiﬁcant impact on the I(2) basis, and if the dummy cannot be excluded
from the cointegrating space (which is the case), it has to be there.
9This is a step dummy, that should catch the eﬀect of the 1998 : 8 crisis on the levels of the involved
variables.
10The trend was included, but was then tested out of the system.
11Unrestricted in this system, this dummy is an impulse (centered) dummy for the structural break in
1998 : 9, that corresponds to the default on the government bonds and abrupt devaluation of the ruble.
12This dummy is not centered, and accumulates to a broken trend.
7section, where a comparison with the analogous Polish systems is made.
3.1 Nominal System {p,pi,re,m,w,y,d98}
Let us consider nominal System 4, {pr,pi,re,m,w,y,d98}, and try to make inferences, under
the assumption that the data is I(2).
I nT a b l e2 ,t h et r a c et e s tr e s u l t sa r er e p o r t e d ,a n dt h eh y p o t h e s i so fr =3cannot be
rejected. This choice is also supported by the sharp eigenvalue drop from r =2to r =3
(Table 2) and by the elimination of one of the three roots of the companion matrix, that
are close to one, when rank changes from r =4to r =3(Table 23). The last sign also
points to the natural choice for this system (p =6 ):r =3 ,s 2 =2 ,s 1 =1 .T h e t w o I ( 2 )
trends are chosen, also due to the Table 23 result that two large roots remain after the rank
is constrained to 3.
Table 3. Misspeciﬁcation tests
autocorrelation ARCH Skewness Normality
F(5,37) F(5,32) χ2(2)
sys13 1.38 [0.08] 0.10 [1.00] 42.99 [0.00] **
pr 1.07 [0.39] 1.00 [0.43] 0.57 10.81 [0.00] **
pi 1.51 [0.21] 1.00 [0.43] 0.05 0.51 [0.77]
re 0.74 [0.59] 0.21 [0.95] 0.66 12.15 [0.00] **
m 1.37 [0.25] 1.70 [0.17] 0.33 2.59 [0.27]
w 1.57 [0.19] 0.15 [0.97] 0.32 29.14 [0.00] **
y 1.15 [0.35] 0.44 [0.81] -0.15 2.80 [0.25]
Table 4. Trace test results.
Ho : rank ≤ re i g e n v a l u e−T\SumLog 95%
r =0 0.68 212** 94.2
r ≤ 1 0.65 129** 68.5
r ≤ 2 0.43 58.07** 47.2
r ≤ 3 0.17 27.23 29.7
r ≤ 4 0.15 12.65 15.4
r ≤ 5 0.02 1.42 3.8
Table 5. The largest roots.
unrestricted 0.95 0.87 0.87 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.58
r =5 1 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.66 0.66 0.57
r =4 1 1 0.96 0.82 0.82 0.67 0.67
r =3 1 1 1 0.89 0.89 0.64 0.64
r = 2 1111 0.89 0.83 0.64
r = 1 11111 0.86 0.73
Therefore, we need to conduct the I(2) analysis in order to obtain proper results on
the long-run and medium-run dynamics. Table 6 provides the results of the (single variable)
tests for long-run exclusion, I(1)ness, and zero raws in the long-run adjustment matrix. We
see that money is weakly exogenous in the long run, and that the real exchange rate is an
I(1) variable, if r =4 . All variables enter long-run relations.
13The test statistics are F(180,49) for autocorrelation, F(525,36) for ARCH, and χ
2(10) for normality tests.
8Table 6. Tests.
rdχ2(d) pr pi re m w y d98
Long-run exclusion, χ2(r)
33 7 .84 6 .42 6 .02 2 .53 3 .74 9 .81 6 .23 9 .5
44 9 .54 8 .12 7 .92 4 .33 3 .74 9 .81 6 .84 0 .3
I(1)ness, χ2(p − r)
34 9 .49 32.84 34.88 23.58 33.73 33.95 34.25
43 7 .81 11.70 12.86 2.68 13.00 12.91 11.73
Zero coeﬃcient in α, χ2(r)
33 7 .81 56.09 24.57 25.06 1.80 41.67 14.44
44 9 .49 58.04 25.54 26.55 1.80 42.71 15.14
In Table 7, the Π matrix is presented (signiﬁcant values are in bold). It supports the
previous conclusion that money is weakly exogenous in the long run while it fuels into wage
and exchange rate dynamics.
Table 7. The Π matrix.
pr pi re m w y d98
∆pr -0.21 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.17 -0.10 0.16
∆pi -0.26 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.18 -0.15 0.12
∆re 0.1 0.04 -0.31 0.35 -0.45 -0.09 -0.20
∆m -0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.06
∆w -0.14 0.09 0.05 0.29 -0.49 -0.21 0.19
∆y -0.23 -0.01 -0.19 0.13 0.07 -0.18 0.04
From the Π matrix above, one can deﬁne the following relations:
(1) wages contribute to inﬂation, price increases harm output growth (see also equation
for ∆y), the crisis dummy has a signiﬁcant positive impact on price level and inﬂation:
prt =0 .8prt−1 +0 .17wt−1 − 0.1yt−1 +0 .16d98t−1;
(2) domestic inﬂation is explained by the imported inﬂation from the trade partners,
changes in output and price level: ∆pr = ∆pi − 0.01w +0 .04(pr + y + d98);
(3) growth in price levels harms output, and depreciation is good for producers: yt =
0.8yt−1 − 0.23prt−1 − 0.19ret−1, which suggests that the ruble was indeed ineﬃciently over-
valued.
However, identiﬁcation of the system is needed, in order to distinguish between long-
term and short-term relations, as well as to test a more theoretically founded hypothesis.
3.1.1 Identiﬁcation
In this section, we are trying to identify the space β0, which is actually the space {β0,β1} in
the I(2) framework. The relationships found are at most I(1), and the hypothesis cannot be
rejected with χ2(3) = 3.72[0.29].
9Table 8. Identiﬁed cointegration space (β0,β1)



















and adjustment coeﬃcients α0.
pr -0.11 0.21 0.50
pi -0.12 0.26 0.49
re 0.32 -0.16 -0.97
m 0.02 0.03 0.097
w 0.34 0.15 -0.01
y -0.06 0.24 0.26
From the two last vectors above, one can obtain: pr =0 .55(m − y)+0 .65d98,w h i c h
suggests a completely monetary inﬂation. It is also easy to see that import and internal prices
do not enter the same long-run relations, which suggests that import prices were important
only in the short-run. Also, import prices and real eﬀective exchange rate do not enter the
same relationships. This is because we actually do not need these variables together in the
system: we would like to have pr, pi and nominal eﬀective exchange rate, but unfortunately
we do not have ne for Russia. Therefore, we move to the next system that should give us
a more consistent picture, after the impact of pi on output and other variables has been
described in System 4.
3.2 Nominal System {(p,re,m,w,y,d98),d}
Let us consider in this section a nominal system, {pr,re,m,w,y,d98},ddd98. Table 9 repre-
sents the misspeciﬁcation test results. The trace test results are shown in the next table. We
would have to choose between r =1and r =2in the analysis that follows.
Table 11 presents the largest roots of the companion matrix. We see that it is diﬃcult
to draw conclusions, as there are too many large roots, but it seems that r =1 or r =2 ,
and s2 =3 , because these are the cases when only three large roots remain.
Table 9. Misspeciﬁcation tests
autocorrelation ARCH Skewness Normality
F(5,40) F(5,35) χ2(2)
sys14 1.12 [0.29] 331.99 [0.24] 37.09 [0.00] **
pr 1.24 [0.31] 1.33 [0.28] 0.59 12.20 [0.00] **
re 1.57 [0.19] 0.76 [0.58] 0.41 18.97 [0.00] **
m 1.36 [0.26] 1.75 [0.15] 0.33 2.84 [0.24]
w 1.47 [0.22] 0.17 [0.97] 0.59 17.06 [0.00] **
y 0.64 [0.67] 0.70 [0.62] -0.25 2.60 [0.27]
14The test statistics are: F(125,83) for autocorrelation, χ
2(315) for ARCH, and χ
2(10) for normality tests.
10Table 10. Trace test results.
Ho : rank ≤ re i g e n v a l u e−T\SumLog 95%
r =0 0.43 89.23** 68.5
r ≤ 1 0.29 49.89* 47.2
r ≤ 2 0.18 26.50 29.7
r ≤ 3 0.14 12.53 15.4
r ≤ 4 0.03 2.09 3.8
Table 11. The largest roots.
unrestricted 0.94 0.88 0.88 0.73 0.73 0.64 0.49
r =4 1 1.00 0.81 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.49
r =3 1 1 0.91 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.53
r =2 1 1 1 0.92 0.65 0.65 0.54
r = 1 1111 0.70 0.69 0.69
This choice is supported by the following table of tests on I(1)ness, long-run exclusion
and long-run weak exogeneity. We see that money is weakly exogenous in the long run, as
expected. The important ﬁnding in Table 12 is that we cannot exclude the step dummy from
the analysis and also cannot ignore the I(2) properties of the data. In the next section, we
use a property of the 1998 default crisis that helps us to eliminate the necessity of having the
step dummy in the cointegration space, and to conduct proper I(2) analysis of an analogous
system.
Table 12. Tests for exclusion, I(1)ness, and ’weak exogeneity’.
rdχ2(d) pr re m w y d98
Long-run exclusion, χ2(r)
1 1 3.84 30.34 0.05 0.18 5.92 15.91 17.99
2 2 5.99 41.93 7.43 7.08 24.84 28.71 41.79
I(1)ness, χ2(p − r)
1 5 11.07 67.68 61.81 69.09 69.12 67.20
2 4 9.49 38.27 34.10 39.29 39.52 40.86
Zero coeﬃcient in α, χ2(r)
1 1 3.84 29.97 3.99 0.42 2.25 9.05
2 2 5.99 51.75 4.53 1.29 29.90 9.13
The following two tables represent the I(2) models corresponding to these systems,
without the step dummy in the cointegration space. We consider both cases of r =1and
r =2 . One can see that there is a third stochastic trend in the system that is driven by the
prices and exchange rate together. Output has a large coeﬃcient, because it is a nominal
indicator, and we can attribute it to the price-driven stochastic trend. Therefore, if we could
sum up the pr and re variables, we should get a system with only two stochastic trends. We
are trying to achieve this in the next section.
11Table 13. The I(2) space, r =1 ,s 1 =0 ,s 2 =3
β1 k1 β⊥1 β⊥2.1 β⊥2.2 β⊥2.3
pr 1 0.33 1.64 -0.20 0.94 -22.39
re 0.5 1.22 0.14 -8.50 1.19 -21.45
m 0.5 1.34 -15.81 -0.06 0.54 17.44
w -1.7 1.17 12.94 -1.86 0.91 -1.85
y 1.3 0.26 20.23 1.22 -0.24 16.78
and adjustment coeﬃcients.
α1 α⊥1 α⊥2.1 α⊥2.2 α⊥2.3
dpr -0.1 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.15
dre 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.06
dm 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.13
dw 0.1 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.07
dy -0.12 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
Table 14. The I(2) space, r =2 ,s 1 =0 ,s 2 =3
β1 k1 β2 k2 β⊥2.1 β⊥2.2 β⊥2.3
pr 1 0.4 0.59 -0.15 1.53 1.30 -16.26
re 0.53 1.34 1 1.22 -0.59 -7.07 -16.19
m 0.50 1.59 -1.89 —1.37 -0.51 -2.84 3.32
w -1.67 0.94 1.66 -1.51 -0.21 -0.39 8.07
y 1.35 -0.19 0.68 -1.77 1.29 2.33 27.32
and adjustment coeﬃcients.
α1 α2 α⊥2.1 α⊥2.2 α⊥2.3
dpr -0.10 0.00 0.69 0.04 -0.04
dre 0.08 -0.10 0.08 0.04 -0.03
dm 0.01 0.01 -0.24 0.12 0.01
dw 0.11 -0.08 0.26 -0.02 0.01
dy -0.12 -0.09 -0.33 -0.01 0.02
3.3 Transformation: Nominal System {(p + re,m,w,y,t),d}
Let us consider System 6: {pr + re,m,w,y,t},ddd98. We have used the property of the
previous system, i.e. that the shock to prices was almost fully absorbed by the change in the
real eﬀective exchange rate (see Fig. 2), and therefore by adding these variables we could get
rid of the structural break, and test the step dummy out. This transformation is not only
dictated by technical considerations. From the IFS deﬁnition of the real eﬀective exchange
rate, we know that
reC
R
= prR − piC + ne C
R
. (4)
Here, the indices mean units from which the index variables were constructed. C stands
for the importing countries’ aggregated currency, and R stands for ruble; ne is nominal
eﬀe c t i v ee x c h a n g er a t e .T h ea b o v er e l a t i o nt r a n s f o r m st o
prR + reC






















Figure 4: Russia, data levels for System 6.
which shows that the transformation makes sense in an economy that is heavily depen-
dent on the external sector, namely exchange rate and import prices. This new variable would
represent a price, corrected for import-local price diﬀerential. It should not be a problem to
sum prices in two diﬀerent currencies, as all variables are indices; however, this implicitly in-
cludes exchange rate in the analysis. Numerous studies of the Russian economy have stressed
the importance of the external sector embodied in the dollarization of the monetary system.
Anecdotal evidence of the transactions still being evaluated in dollars (or, so-called ’condi-
tional units’) suggests the same. The graphs of the levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences are presented
in Fig.4 and Fig.5.
I nT a b l e1 5 ,t h es p e c i ﬁcation of the model is presented. One can see that the model
is correctly speciﬁed, and the normality failure is not at all associated with non-symmetric
measures. The speciﬁcation has also signiﬁcantly improved, in comparison to the system 4
analysis.
Table 15. Misspeciﬁcation tests.
autocorrelation ARCH Skewness Normality
F(5,42) F(5,37) χ2(2)
sys15 1.17[0.23] 587.06[0.08] 20.03[0.01]
prre 3.29[0.01] 0.63[0.68] -0.00 2.24[0.33]
m 0.46[0.80] 1.37[0.26] 0.21 0.69[0.71]
w 1.35[0.26] 0.09[0.99] 0.01 15.39[0.00]**
y 0.39[0.85] 0.48[0.78] -0.23 1.74[0.42]
15The system test statistics are: F(80,97) for autocorrelation, χ






























Figure 5: Russia, data ﬁrst diﬀerences for System 6.
The trace test shows a very low rank. Considering Tables 34 and 35, and taking into
account the analysis of System 5 in the previous section, we decide on the r =1 ,a si tb r i n g s
most of the large roots down, leaving only two.
Table 16. Trace test results
Ho : rank ≤ re i g e n v a l u e−T\SumLog 95%
r =0 0.35 58.36 63.0
r ≤ 1 0.19 28.6 42.4
r ≤ 2 0.15 13.68 25.3
r ≤ 3 0.04 2.56 12.3
Table 17. The largest roots.
unrestricted 0.90 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.42
r =3 1 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72
r =2 1 1 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.48
r =1 1 1 1 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.48
Our choice is therefore r =1 ,s 2 =2 , which leaves s1 =1and corresponds to System 5
analysis.
14Table 18. Trace test for I(2) model.
rS (r|s1) Q(r)
0 236.7 146.2 90.6 67.7 58.4
(132.02)( 107.91)( 87.9)( 71.33) (59.02)
1 145.9 65.4 35.5 28.6
(82.29)( 64.23)( 49.69) (39.26)




s2 43 2 1 0
I perform an I(2) analysis of the chosen system, after considering the exclusion and
I(1)ness tests below. None of the variables is I(1), and m and w show long-run weak exo-
geneity. This can actually be an indication of these variables being very close to I(1) process,
in the I(2) system. In this case, these variables would constitute the medium-run dynamics,
a n dw ed on o te x c l u d et h e m ,r e m e m b e r i n ga l s ot h a tt h a ts p e c i ﬁcation was ﬁne. However, an
exclusion of m is the sign of all systems considered so far, as money is supposed to be exoge-
nous. And we could also explain the weak exogeneity of wages in Russia, as wage arrears,
barter payments, and shadow wages are not included into the wage variable.
Table 19. Tests.
rdχ2(d) prre m w y trend
Long-run exclusion, χ2(r)
11 3 .84 5.79 2.81 1.38 10.75 10.17
22 5 .99 9.04 4.50 1.87 12.81 10.94
I(1)ness, χ2(p − r)
12 9 .49 25.73 24.93 24.79 28.18
21 9 .49 14.22 14.36 14.55 13.36
Zero coeﬃcient in α, χ2(r)
11 3 .84 1.91 0.91 0.03 14.23
22 5 .99 5.07 2.20 0.08 16.24
The next table represents the I(2) space basis. For the choice of rank and two I(2)
trends we do not have a long-run stable relationship, and only polynomially cointegrating
relations, and one pure I(1) trend.
15Table 20. The I(2) space, r =1 ,s 1 =1 ,s 2 =2
β1 k β⊥1 β⊥2.1 β⊥2.2
prre 1 2.32 2.12 11.16 -16.60
m -0.95 -1.78 4.96 -9.08 10.98
w -0.65 0.03 -9.63 -0.07 -0.87
y 1.88 -2.12 -1.96 -10.56 14.10
trend 0.02
and adjustment coeﬃcients.
α1 α⊥1 α⊥2.1 α⊥2.2
dprre -0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.03
dm -0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.01
dw -0.01 -0.11 -0.00 -0.01
dy -0.17 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
If we take into account the fact that output is a nominal index variable, and therefore
all signs of I(2)ness that it displays are due to the Laspeyres formula that it is calculated
from (and, therefore, to the price level), we see that money remains the only source of price
growth, as indicated by the constructed variable prre. Wages could be excluded not only
from the system (see above) but also do not signiﬁcantly contribute to the I(2) trend. Wage
behavior is the opposite to the Polish case, where wages were the main source of inﬂation.
3.3.1 Identiﬁcation
Unfortunately, we do not have the statistics for the coeﬃcients obtained in the I(2) analysis.
In this section, we try to identify the relation β1x that is I(1), and that is made I(0) with the
addition of the product k0∆x. The following just-identifying restrictions were imposed and
could not be rejected with statistics χ2(3) = 6.62[0.1].
Therefore, the following long-run relation is I(1):
pr + re − m + y +0 .003t ∼ I(1).
In Fig. 6 the graph and diﬀerence of the variable are presented, and it does look like an
I(1) process. It can be made stationary by adding the diﬀerences times the vector k, which is
proportional to the I(2) trends from Table 20. Without doing this, it could be viewed as the
money velocity equation, but corrected for the external sector. As mentioned above, this is a
reasonable correction for Russia, where dollarization of the economy, dependence on imports
and export of oil have become the main features of transition.
Table 21. Identiﬁed cointegration space β1
prre m w y t
1 −10 1 0 .003
(0.0006)















Figure 6: I(1) relation β0
1x, System 6 for Russia.
For the real output equation, we would get the following:
2pr + re− m +( y − pr)+0 .003t ∼ I(1),
even though the output should be corrected by the PPI index, it shows good cointe-
gration with CPI-based pr as well.
It is interesting to note that wages are statistically weakly exogenous in the long run,
unlike in Poland, where they have become the main instrument of stabilization. However,
from Table 20 (relation β⊥1 that can be made stationary only by taking diﬀerences, and
therefore represents the medium run) we could extract a dependence of the inﬂation rate on
wage increases, in the medium run:
∆pr = −∆re− 2.5∆m +5 ∆w + ∆y.
Even though we cannot say anything about causality here, increases in wages were
associated with increases in inﬂation in the medium run.
3.4 Introducing Barter Payments: Nominal System {(p + re,mb,w,y,t),d}
Let us now consider system 7: {pr+re,mb,w,y,t},ddd98, where mb is the money mass from
the previous analysis, corrected for barter payments expressed in nominal rubles (mb = m+by,
where b i st h ep e r c e n t a g eo fb a r t e ri nt o t a ls a l e s ,s e eF i g . 1 ) .
17Table 22. Misspeciﬁcation tests.
autocorrelation ARCH Skewness Normality
F(5,43) F(5,38) χ2(2)
sys16 1.56 [0.02] * 556.87 [0.3] 16.52 [0.04] *
prre 2.19 [0.07] 0.84 [0.53] 0.03 4.35 [0.11]
mb 0.99 [0.44] 0.52 [0.76] 0.12 0.22 [0.90]
w 0.13 [0.98] 0.23 [0.94] 0.40 12.36 [0.002] **
y 0.08 [0.99] 0.17 [0.97] 0.30 1.64 [0.44]
The trace test shows that rank is either one or two, and from the analysis of the roots
of the companion matrix, we conclude the same, and also see that the system probably has
two common I(2) trends, due to at least the two largest roots remaining in all systems.
Table 23. Trace test results
Ho : rank ≤ re i g e n v a l u e−T\SumLog 95%
r =0 0.48 85.37** 63.0
r ≤ 1 0.25 40.25 42.4
r ≤ 2 0.19 19.73 25.3
r ≤ 3 0.07 5.214 12.3
Table 24. The roots.
unrestricted 0.97 0.81 0.81 0.73 0.73 0.42 0.26
r =3 1 0.82 0.82 0.73 0.73 0.41 0.23
r =2 1 1 0.79 0.79 0.63 0.43 0.21
r =1 1 1 1 0.77 0.77 0.46 0.22
The I(2) trace test shows that if this system has rank two, it also has either one or
two I(2) trends. In the analysis that follows we consider system {r =1 ,s 2 =2 } in order to
compare it to the previous analysis in the framework with one cointegrating vector, and then
move to the system {r =2 ,s 2 =2 } which seems the natural choice here.
Table 25. Trace test for I(2) model.
rS (r|s1) Q(r)
0 282.99 211.69 142.49 86.48 72.06
132.02 107.91 87.97 1 .33 59.02
1 164.87 99.55 56.06 38.25
82.29 64.23 49.69 39.26
2 34.24 20.49 20.24
44.53 1 .61 22.98
3 44.33 3.83
17.57 10.63
s2 432 1 0
From Table 26 one can see that y can be excluded from the long-run relations, and that
either prre or w is weakly exogenous. Additional tests are needed to see if they are weakly
exogenous simultaneously. As there are no variables that can be both weakly exogenous
and excludable from the long-run relations, I proceed with the present system, which is well
16The system test statistics are: F(80,97) for autocorrelation, χ
2(540) for ARCH, and χ
2(8) for normality
test.
18speciﬁed. Interestingly, in comparison to Table 19, the role of the variables has changed: if
in the classic analysis money and wages were excludable, and these and prre appeared to
be (separately) weakly exogenous, after the inclusion of barter into analysis, output can be
excluded from the long-run relations, while only wages and prre appear to be (separately)
weakly exogenous. Apparently, information that is in the dynamics of barter changed the
long-run relations in the system. Even though the same result holds for the main variable
under consideration (w), it is now weaker.
Table 26. Tests.
rdχ2(d) prre mb w y trend
Long-run exclusion, χ2(r)
11 3.48 8.08 9.52 6.68 0.00 8.47
22 5.99 9.34 9.57 6.73 0.62 10.15
I(1)ness, χ2(p − r)
14 9.49 25.28 20.78 24.21 28.67
23 7.81 14.48 13.33 15.07 14.01
Zero coeﬃcient in α, χ2(r)
11 3.48 0.51 7.27 0.58 8.53
22 5.99 1.77 7.28 0.59 8.81
For the case analogous to the previous analysis, with rank equal to one and two common
I(2) trends, we obtain the following space basis:
Table 27. The I(2) space, r =1 ,s 1 =1 ,s 2 =2
β1 k β⊥1 β⊥2.1 β⊥2.2
prre 1.00 0.52 2.43 -1.13 -0.11
mb -0.64 1.97 -7.73 0.08 4.77
w -1.05 -0.62 7.13 -1.06 -2.73
y -0.02 -5.17 -3.55 -3.07 -15.95
trend 0.02
and adjustment coeﬃcients.
α1 α⊥1 α⊥2.1 α⊥2.2
dprre -0.04 -0.02 0.21 0.11
dmb 0.33 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
dw 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.02
dy -0.14 -0.03 -0.1 -0.08
It is easy to see from the table that the inclusion of barter changes the system con-
siderably. There are more signs of wages being correlated one to one with prre than before,
and the role of money has diminished. If in system 6 money was the main explosive force,
strongly correlated with prre, in system 7 it is still one of the drivers of the explosive vectors,
but not the sole driver. Concerning wages, the signs of their cointegration with prices, even
though strengthened, are still weaker than in Poland.
The next table corresponds to the more likely case of r =2 , for the same system. It
can be seen that the result does not change much from the previous table. However, it makes
more sense: one of the explosive trends is driven by the money and wages together, and
another is driven by all the nominal variables.
19T a b l e2 8 .T h eI ( 2 )s p a c e ,r =2 ,s 1 =0 ,s 2 =2
β1 k1 β2 k2 β⊥2.1 β⊥2.2
prre 1.00 0.18 1.00 -1.06 1.51 1.60
mb -0.65 0.08 0.11 0.07 -1.67 -9.77
w -1.05 0.12 -0.26 -1.04 2.47 7.54
y - 0 . 0 20 . 0 9- 1 . 7 1- 0 . 4 6 0 . 4 1 - 0 . 7 9
t 0.02 -0.01
and adjustment coeﬃcients.
α1 α2 α⊥2.1 α⊥2.2
dprre -0.04 -0.12 -0.28 0.13
dmb 0.33 0.02 0.54 -0.10
dw 0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.01
dy -0.14 0.04 -0.15 0.00
In the next subsection the cointegration basis in the I(1) framework is identiﬁed (see
section 2).
3.4.1 Identiﬁcation
The following hypothesis about the cointegration space was accepted with statistics χ2(4) =
6.62[0.58]. It strongly supports the hypothesis that prre and wages are both weakly exogenous
and can be excluded from the basis. However, one should not forget that these tests were
performed in the I(1) framework, and even if the variables can be excluded from the long-run
relations, their diﬀerences would still enter polynomially cointegrating relations etc.
Table 29. Identiﬁed cointegration space β1












Therefore, the following long-run relation is I(1): 4mb + y − 0.7t ∼ I(1). Increases in
total money (or barter) were harmful for the output.
The following hypothesis is accepted with statistics χ2(8) = 14.9[0.06] (the hypothesis
with α unrestricted was accepted with χ2(4) = 8.2[0.08]). Wages could not be tested out
of this system. This shows the increased importance of this variable, after the inclusion of
barter into analysis. However, its role in the economy is still weak, as it is weakly exogenous
in the long run.
20Table 30. Identiﬁed cointegration space β1
prre mb w y t
1 −1 −10 0 .021
(0.001)
1 −0.5 −10 .50 .011
(0.001)











pr + re − mb − w +0 .02t ∼ I(1) or pr = −re+ mb + w − 0.02t
re+0 .5(y − mb) − (w − pr)+0 .01t ∼ I(0) or y = mb +2 ( w − pr) − 2re+0 .02t
The following story may apply concerning the change of the result with the introduction
of barter. As noted before, the wages variable is not the actual wage payments to the workers.
In the Russia of this period, it includes the wage arrears, i.e. the part of wages that workers
were entitled to receive but did not in practice (see footnote on page 3). Therefore, the fact
that this variable did not play a role in the system with all other ”virtual” variables was
easily explained by this. Indeed, after the introduction of barter, wages started playing a
more important role.
It is interesting that we might actually have a natural experiment here: we observe
a variable as it was supposed to be, while it was not such in practice. Thus, any result
that we obtain is an ”if” result, i.e. given that there were no arrears. If there had been no
arrears and no barter, system 6 would tell us everything we needed to know about such an
economy, and wages would not play any substantial role (indeed, it is so). However, when
barter is introduced along with the ”wrong” wages, we see that the wage variable becomes
binding, and if it had been a true wage, a reduction would have been beneﬁcial, in order
to curb inﬂation. This seems to be exactly what happened in Russia: an overly restrictive
monetary policy created barter, and then when the wages became explosive, arrears emerged
as a natural substitute for the never implemented incomes policy. Causality must however
be controlled for, although this would not change the logic of this paper, as I do not study
the data on wage arrears.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The analysis above shows the following features of the Russian economy: (1) import prices
do not inﬂuence domestic prices in the long run; (2) exchange rate is very important for the
price dynamics; (2) inﬂation has a very large monetary root; (3) wages are not important in
the system without barter; (4) in the system with barter, the long-run relations change, and
wages gain more weight, while money and exchange rate still play the important role; (5)
wage-price one-to-one long-run stationary relation is found in the system with barter, and
also some evidence of money-for-wages printing.
The distinctive feature of the Russian analysis is the change of the results after the
introduction of barter. While in the system with money, wages and exchange rates, wages
could be excluded, in the same system with money variable corrected for barter payments,
21the role of wages increases, and the stochastic trends changed signiﬁcantly. This fact might
point to an important detail of Russian transition. Apparently, wage arrears and barter are
two closely connected processes, both related to the policy of monetary tightening. They also
served as natural buﬀers in the demonetized economy: barter as an extension to the monetary
stock, and wage arrears as a cap on the nominal wages. While it is good that, notwithstanding
the too restrictive policies, spontaneous mechanisms were created, it is obvious that they
have had a detrimental impact on the long-run output and have not brought fast ﬁnancial
stabilization (more than ten years in Russia, in comparison with two years in Poland, where
proper policies were implemented).
This partly solves the Russia-Poland puzzle, and supports Stiglitz’s view on the Russian
transition and the role of the policy-makers in it.
5 Comparison to the Polish Case
After a comparison to the Polish case studied in Vostroknutova (2003), it turns out that
money was endogenous in the short run and exogenous in the long run for both Poland and
Russia. In Poland, re was led by both monetary and real shocks. In Russia, its dynamics
were most inﬂuenced by monetary shocks in the long run and by shocks to the domestic
price level in the short run. Appreciation of the re was good for the Polish producers, while
it was detrimental for the Russian output, which is consistent with the fact that there was
initial over-depreciation in Poland, and initial over-appreciation in Russia. Price level growth
beneﬁted Polish production, while it was harmful in Russia. Whereas in Russia real variables
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the dynamics of nominal systems, in Poland this is true only for the
re. From the main systems analyzed, Polish inﬂation had its roots in the wage growth,
while in Russia it was mainly due to money growth and exchange rate policy. However, after
correction of the Russian money variable for barter, the picture changed. Wages started to
play a more important role in the new system. Still all variables contributed to the stochastic
trends, and neither of them could be excluded from the long-run relations.
It is postulated that for the CB to be able to control inﬂation, its independence, along
with stable money-price relationship, and exogeneity of money, are required. Having analyzed
two diﬀerent transition economies, it is argued that money can be assumed to be exogenous
for both of them. In Russia, the existence of a stable long-run money-price relationship is
undermined, while money has a very large impact on the dynamics of the stochastic compo-
nent of prices. In Poland, money did not play the most important role in price dynamics, and
h a do n l ya ni n d i r e c te ﬀect on the real system, through the exchange rate. In both countries,
an I(1) relation between money and prices was found, which contradicts classical theory, and
might be an indication of the dependence on institutional changes during the transition pe-
riod. These ﬁndings generally support previous research on transition countries that has not
discovered a stable direct relationship between money and prices. However, I argue that in
Russia money had a greater eﬀect on the overall nominal price performance than in Poland,
and that inﬂation had monetary roots in Russia as opposed to the wage-driven inﬂation in
Poland.
Fischer and Sahay (2000) mention Poland and Russia as two examples of on-time
and ”too late” exiting from the peg regime correspondingly. This can also be seen in the
data, as the exchange rate is a binding constraint in the Russian system (and has a strong
impact on prices), while it is weakly exogenous to the Polish system and does not inﬂuence
22stochastic dynamics (although it enters stable relations with correct sign). It is an interesting
result that in Poland real appreciation had a positive eﬀect on the output, while in Russia
it had a negative eﬀect.17 This ﬁnding is generally consistent with the theory that claims
over-depreciation in Poland, and over-appreciation in Russia before 1998 (see, for example,
Fischer and Sahay, 2001).
Polish output is moderately inﬂuenced by money variable (monetary easing is associated
with more output). In Russia, on the other hand, if barter is taken into account, growth in
the new mb variable is harmful for the output. Growth in the money base only is, however,
positively inﬂuencing output. These results might suggest that monetary policy was too
restrictive, and in the absence of other regulations, it created ”natural stabilizers” like barter
and arrears. These instruments were harmful for the output and turned out to be less eﬃcient
in bringing the inﬂation down (comparatively to Poland).
One can see that the policies implemented in Poland did, in fact, work, and stabilized
the economy, while in Russia the ability of the CB to control the money stock and exchange
rate is doubtful in the long run. The main ingredient of the Polish stabilization remains the
popiwek tax on wage increases, while in Russia the external sector and money stock are the
main channels of nominal price growth.18 After accounting for barter in the Russian case, we
see the role of wages increasing, but money still remains very important. The wage arrears
that were present in the Russian economy and took approximately 27.7% of the state sector
wages in 1997, seem to be an ’unoﬃcial’ mechanism of curbing inﬂation, analogous to the
’oﬃcial’ popiwek tax in Poland.
Two stabilization policies were compared. The Polish one has been called the ”scorched
earth” policy, because of its harmful social eﬀect, and due to the belief that a much less
restrictive monetary (and especially incomes) policy would have had the same stabilizing
eﬀect. I found that the Polish government ’scorched the earth’ for a reason: the analysis
shows that the popiwek tax on wage increases was the main and, indeed, almost the only
instrument of stabilization, without which inﬂation would probably have been of an explosive
nature. However, it also follows from the data that more inﬂation would have been beneﬁcial
for output growth.
The Russian stabilization was also assumed to be a Big Bang policy, until it was
realized that the reforms and stabilization packages were not implemented fully and were
often reversed (Buch, 1998, among others). It is beyond the scope of this paper to understand
the reality of the threats of the Russian ex-ante political constraints, and what would have
happened if a Polish-type policy had indeed been implemented fully there. It is obvious,
however, that the inertia in stabilization, a too restrictive monetary policy combined with an
over-appreciated exchange rate of the ruble, caused a decade of stagnation in Russia and, by
extension, in many countries of the CIS as well.
17The fact that we used nominal output for Russia should not matter, as the real output can be extracted
by summation.
18It is interesting, when reading the reports about Russian transition, 90 percent of the government an-
nouncements promise to increase the minimum wage, but no similar promises are made in Poland. This might
be dependent on the severe political constraints that took place in Russia during the whole period of transition,
and supplied a reason for the prolonged stabilization in the country.
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